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Redistribution Through Public Employment: 
The Case of Italy
ALBERTO ALESINA, STEPHAN DANNINGER,
and MASSIMO ROSTAGNO*
This paper examines the regional distribution of public employment in Italy. It
documents two facts. The first is that public employment is used as a subsidy from
the North to the less wealthy South. About half of the wage bill in the South of Italy
can be identified as a subsidy. Both the size of public employment and the level of
wages are used as a redistributive device. The second fact concerns the effects of
subsidized public employment on individuals’attitudes toward job search, educa-
tion, “risk taking” activities, and so on. Public employment discourages the devel-
opment of market activities in the South. [JEL H53, J31, J64]
T
wo key roles of government are to provide public goods and to redistribute
income across individuals and regions. Often these two functions overlap
since public goods provision may also be used to compensate for geographical
income imbalances. Public employment, in particular, can be used to support
poorer regions or those with higher unemployment. This paper documents the
size of this type of redistribution between the North and South of Italy and
attempts to evaluate the efficiency of this type of policy. Italy is an especially
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interesting case because of the large income disparity between North and South
and because of the large size of the public employment sector.
In this paper we first document the amount of geographical imbalance in the
allocation of public jobs. Using survey evidence collected by the Bank of Italy,
we then highlight various cultural and social consequences of an extensive
reliance on public employment as a source of jobs and income. Third, we eval-
uate the amount of redistributive flows achieved with public employment.
Our results are striking. We conclude that about half of the public wage
bill in the South of Italy can be defined as a “subsidy.” This effect is due to a
combination of the size of public employment and of the wage premium for
public employees relative to alternative occupations. We also show that the
reliance on public jobs as a redistributive channel implies sizable and possibly
undesirable sociological effects. Since public jobs in the South are more
attractive and available than private sector jobs, educational and attitudinal
choices are tilted toward the public sector. Also, individuals do not want to exit
the public sector unless they are forced to, and this creates path dependence
and rigidities.
In a nutshell, the argument is the following. The two “regions” of Italy
(North and South) are bound by a unitary fiscal system, which implies that
public wages are almost identical in nominal terms between the North and
South. Since the cost of living is much lower in the South, real public wages are
lower in the North than in the South. Also, opportunities in the private sector are
better in the North, so public employment is comparatively more attractive in the
South, relative to alternative opportunities. As a result, residents in the South
seek more public employment in order to take advantage of a large income
premium and a greater job security. Over time the South is caught in an equilib-
rium of dependency in which public jobs are a critical source of disposable
income and in which private opportunities do not materialize.1 This creates a
culture that discourages private activities and entrepreneurship and that becomes
self-fulfilling: the less individuals are prepared to “face the market,” the more
they prefer public jobs. 
But, if this is the case, why is this redistributive system chosen? One answer
may be that this is simply a by-product of a centralized fiscal system and central-
ized union bargaining, which fixes equal nominal wages for the entire country.
However, the lack of any attempt to diversify public wages between the North and
South suggests that the implied redistribution might be politically desirable. The
reason may be that redistribution through public employment is less visible than
direct transfers, therefore it is politically less costly and may be more effective at
creating patronage for local politicians. In fact, a model by Coate and Morris
(1995), slightly modified by Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (2000), clarifies this
politico-economic argument. The idea is simple: suppose that a proposal that
introduces a tax in region 1 (North) to finance a direct subsidy to region 2 (South)
1See Raffa and Zollo (1993) for a discussion of the difficulties of small private innovative business
ventures in the South.would not pass because it is opposed by voters in the North. Further assume that
the government wants to redistribute toward the South and assume that, say,
several new teachers are hired and disproportionately placed in the South. This
second redistributive policy is less transparent (although perhaps less efficient)
and may win approval even in the North because of the uncertainty about the real
needs of the public school system. 
Public employment may also be used to correct labor market imperfections.
When labor markets do not produce full employment, say, because of tax distor-
tions and rigidities, it is politically rewarding to offer public sector jobs. This is
particularly the case when the welfare system (as in Italy) is distorted and inef-
fective at protecting the temporarily unemployed. In fact, Rostagno and Utili
(1997) and Boeri (2000) describe the shortcomings of the Italian system of social
protection and conclude that the Italian “welfare state” is very skewed in favor of
retirees and does not protect efficiently the temporarily unemployed. Obviously,
while a temporary unemployment subsidy may create incentives for job search, a
permanent employment in the public sector does not.2
Public bureaucracies, once established, become a major political force. In
many countries, and certainly in Italy, public sector unions are particularly strong
and capable of protecting job security, if not the level of real wages.3 This protec-
tion generates hysteresis: once public employment increases, it takes a long time
to be reduced.
This is not the first paper that argues that public employment is used as a
redistributive device. To begin with, there is an immense literature on public
sector employment, most of which is focused on the United States. We refer the
reader to the two excellent surveys by Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986), and
Gregory and Borland (1999). For our purposes, the latter paper, which focuses
not only on the United States but on the evidence available for other member
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) as well, concludes that “public sector employees generally have higher
average earnings than private sector employees.” Furthermore, the authors write,
“in most countries, some part of this difference is also attributable to higher rates
of pay or rents for public sector employees.” Particularly interesting are the
results of Borjas (1986), who examines wage variations in U.S. state public
employment and attributes three-fourths of the interstate variation to political
variables reflecting the demand of different constituencies. Also, Katz and
Krueger (1991) find that in the United States, while local and state governments
are responsive to local economic conditions, the market for federal employees is
set outside the regional context. 
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2A related problem concerns the use of disability pensions in Italy. These pensions have been largely
used especially in the South as permanent unemployment subsidy, with the obvious distortionary effects
on incentives. See Boeri (2000).
3For a review of the literature on public unions, see Gregory and Borland (1999) and Freeman and
Ichniowski (1988).I. The Distribution of Public Employment in Italy
The Data
As a source for macroeconomic data on regional differences, we draw on various
Italian government statistics. Data on regional production, population, and
employment are taken from publications of Istituto Nazionale di Statistica
(ISTAT), Italy’s national statistical institute (ISTAT, 1996a and 1996b). Figures on
the regional distribution of public employment are taken from Il Conto Annuale
(Italian Treasury, 1995), an annual publication of the Italian Treasury. Our data for
postal and railroad employees have been provided by the Italian Treasury.
The main data source for our empirical microanalysis is the Bank of Italy
survey on Household Income and Wealth (BIW). The BIW is a biannual household
survey that covers all regions in Italy and contains a broad range of information on
individual characteristics and economic performance. We use data from surveys in
1993 and 1995 that contain detailed information on socioeconomic factors rele-
vant to our study. 
The 1995 (1993) BIW survey provides information on 23,924 (24,013) indi-
viduals covering a total of 8,135 (8,089) households. A special feature of this
survey is that it contains information on parents and children of the head of the
household. This allows us to track intergenerational links (family ties) and relate
them to public sector employment. In most of our analysis we restrict the sample
to respondents between age 15 and 62 for men and 57 for women, the traditional
standard age of retirement.4 Note that the BIW survey oversamples government
employees by a factor of two, an issue that we discuss below.
Table 1 lists all the variables used in this paper and their sources. Table 2
provides sample statistics for some of the variables used in our empirical analysis
of the 1995 BIW survey.
Imbalance in the Distribution of Public Jobs
For the purposes of discussion in this paper, we have divided Italy into three
regions: North, Center, and South.5 As Table 3 shows, Italy has a pronounced
mismatch between regional economic output and the use of its public resources.
About 55 percent of total output is produced in the North, while only 44 percent
of the total population resides there. Also, the South of Italy has considerably
fewer labor force participants (51.5 percent compared with 62.5 percent in the
North). The unemployment rate in the South (21.0 percent) is more than double
Alberto Alesina,Stephan Danninger,and Massimo Rostagno
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4Recent pension reforms have changed these age limits.
5Regions are composed as follows: North—Piedmont, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardy, Trentino, Alto
Adige-South Tyrol, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Liguria, and Emilia-Romagna; Center—Tuscany,
Umbria, Marche, and Lazio; South—Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily, and
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Table 1. Definitions of Variables
Variable Description Year Source
Public employees Total number of government 1995 Italian Treasury 
employees including 
national and local employees
Postal workers Total number of postal workers  1995 Italian Treasury
Railroad workers Total number of railroad workers 1997 Italian Treasury
Police Total number of police employees 1995 Italian Treasury
Tax inspectors Total number of tax inspectors 1996 Italian Treasury
Regional product Regional state product 1995 ISTAT
Regional 
unemployment rate Regional unemployment rate 1995 ISTAT
Regional public  Fraction of public employees in the  1995 ISTAT, Italian
employment rate regional labor force (excludes military, Treasury
postal and railroad workers) 
Class size Number of students per session  1995 ISTAT
Log hourly wages Log of hourly disposable labor income  1995 BIW
High school degree Highest degree: high school
College degree Highest degree: college 1995 BIW
Parent schooling Years of schooling: head of household 1995 BIW
Business degree Dummy: holding a business-type   1995 BIW
degree (for a definition, see section 4.3)
Years work experience Years of reported work experience 1995 BIW
Firm size: 20–99  Dummy: reported number of employees  1995 BIW
employees
Firm size: 100–499  Dummy: reported number of employees  1995 BIW
employees
Firm size: more than  Dummy: reported number of employees  1995 BIW
500 employees
White collar  Self-described employment type 1995 BIW
Teacher Self-described employment type 1995 BIWthat in the Center (10.3 percent) and about three times higher than that of the North
(6.7 percent).6
The regional differences in the distribution of public jobs are large. Public
civilian employment per capita is higher in the South than in the North (about 61
public employees per thousand population in the South versus 51 in the North). As
a share of total employment the difference is even more staggering: 12 percent of
the employed in the North are in the public sector against 21 percent in the South.
The comparison with the Center is clouded by the presence of the national capital
in the Lazio region. Including this region, public employment is artificially high
in the Center. For this reason we focus mostly on North-South comparisons.
Table 3 underestimates the differences between North and South for two
reasons. First, it does not include employees of public and semipublic enterprises.
Second, Wagner’s Law implies that the size of government (and thus the number
of public employees) increases with income per capita. Since the South is poorer
than the North, Wagner’s Law predicts a smaller government sector in this region. 
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Table 1. (concluded)
Variable Description Year Source
Mid-management Self-described employment type 1995 BIW
Top management Self-described employment type 1995 BIW
Big city Lives in city with more than  1995 BIW
500,000 inhabitants
Father: manager Dummy: father has/had   1995 BIW
managing position
Father: self-employed Dummy: father is/was self-employed 1995 BIW
Family ties Dummy: indicates whether parent   1995 BIW
or other family member is/was 
employed in the public sector
Dependency rate Fraction of population younger than  1993 BIW
15 and older than 65 1995
Urbanization rate Fraction of population living in city   1993 BIW
with more than 50,000 inhabitants 1995
Sources: BIW (Bank of Italy, 1993 and 1995); Italian Treasury (1995 and 1997); and ISTAT
(1996a and 1996b).
6Regional differences are so large that it seems surprising that there is no significant labor mobility
from South to North. Cannari, Nucci, and Sestito (2000) show that mobility costs (i.e., housing cost of
relocation) are very large and make geographical relocation too costly despite large differences in income.Differences in the age structure of the population in the North and the South
may account for different levels of employment in two large sectors: education and
health. In fact, the fraction of the population below age 14 is higher in the South
than in the North (12.4 percent in the North versus 18.8 percent in the South). On
the contrary, the share of the population above age 65 is higher in the North than
in the South (18.2 percent versus 13.8 percent). This implies that one should
expect more health care employees in the North and more teachers in the South.
As Table 3 shows, health care employees are just slightly more evident in the
North while teachers are far more numerous in the South. Note that the large
number of teachers is able to keep class size as low as in the North. This is a form
of redistribution, since poorer regions with more children receive the same number
of teachers per capita than wealthier regions with fewer children. Also, employ-
ment in public universities is higher in absolute numbers (and, a fortiori, in per
capita terms) in the South than in the North. 
In all the other categories, such as federal and regional administration, public
employment per capita is higher in the South. Note that for some of the points we
make below, on the effects of public employment on labor market structure and
social attitudes, what matters most is the share of public employment in the labor
force or relative to private employment. Evaluated in this way, public employment
in the South is much higher than in the North in all the categories of employment.
REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT: THE CASE OF ITALY
453
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of BIW
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Region
North 0.448 0.497 0 1
Center 0.196 0.397 0 1
South 0.354 0.478 0 1
Household structure
Parents (fraction) 0.640 0.479 0 1
Children (fraction) 0.337 0.473 0 1
Demographics
Age 36.73 13.01 15 62
Male 0.520 0.499 0 1
Married1 0.589 0.491 0 1
Lives in city > 500,000 0.136 0.343 0 1
School 9.737 3.805 3 20
High school 0.363 0.480 0 1
College 0.071 0.257 0 1
Employment status
Unemployed 0.165 0.371 0 1
Retired 0.227 0.418 0 1
Labor force participation  0.634 0.481 0 1
Source: BIW (Bank of Italy, 1995).
1Also includes unmarried people living with a partner.Alberto Alesina,Stephan Danninger,and Massimo Rostagno
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Table 3. Regional Economic Performance and Public Employment
Center
North Center Without Lazio South
Regional product over national product (GDP) 55.1 20.5 10.6 24.3
Regional population over total population 44.4 19.2 10.1 36.4
Participation rate1 62.5 59.7 62.3 51.5
Unemployment rate 6.7 10.3 8.2 21.0
Public employees per 100 residents 5.1 6.9 6.1 6.1
Public administration 0.64 1.53 0.88 0.87
Education and research 1.67 2.14 2.02 2.43
Regional administration 1.12 1.27 1.38 1.30
Health care 1.31 1.22 1.39 1.08
Other 0.35 0.75 0.41 0.42
Public employees per 100 employed 12.4 18.6 15.4 22.1
Public employees per unit of
regional product2 124.0 194.4 155.0 275.1
Police officers per crime 
age population (15–65) 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.11
Police officers per 1000 crimes denounced3 7.3 12.3 13.4 10.7
Tax inspectors per unit of regional tax yield2 11.6 14.2 . . . 59.9
72.9 122.5 134.1 108.3
Postal workers per 100,000 units of 
correspondence4 179.3 566.2 . . . 1,782.7
Railways workers per 100,000 tons of goods 
shipped5 71.2 186.9 121.9 327.9
Age structure: 15 and younger in population 12.4 13.2 12.1 16.1
Age structure: 65 and older in population 18.2 18.4 20.8 13.8
Class size6 (primary school) 16.2 16.9 15.9 18.0
Class size6 (secondary school) 20.7 20.5 20.5 21.0
Sources: ISTAT (1996a and 1996b); and Italian Treasury (1995).
Note: All data refer to 1995, unless otherwise indicated.
1Employed and unemployed as a fraction of population between 15 and 65.
2Regional product and regional tax yield in Lit 100 billion. Taxes (collected in 1996) include
value-added taxes, personal and corporate income tax, the so-called local tax on incomes (ILOR,
abolished in 1997), and customs duties.
3Police officers in 1996 per 1,000 crimes denounced by the police in 1995.
4Number of post office employees per 100,000 letters and parcels sent in 1997.  
5Railways workers in 1997 per 100,000 tons of goods shipped in 1996.  
6Class size defined as students per session.Other Factors: Productivity of Public Jobs and Quality
of Public Service
Although it is difficult to measure the productivity of public employees, evidence
suggests that the productivity of public employees in the South is lower than in the
North.
Tax administration presents a striking picture. In 1996, about 25,000 tax inspec-
tors in the North collected and administered Lit 213 trillion in taxes accruing to the
central administration. While the number of staff devoted to the same tasks in the
South was not significantly lower, taxes collected there amounted to only Lit 34 tril-
lion. Hence, the average productivity of the staff employed in tax administration in
the Northern regions was six times higher than in the South. Some of this striking
difference can be explained by the fact that income per capita in the North is higher
than in the South, so tax collected per number of taxpayers is higher. However, every
indicator of tax evasion suggests that tax compliance is lower in the South, despite
the large number of tax collectors.
Similarly, the regional concentration of personnel within the national post
office and the railways cannot easily be attributed to differences in the demand for
postal services and transportation.7 In the former sector, a Northern worker
“produces” in a year ten times the annual output of her representative Southern
colleague. In the transportation sector, the productivity gap—measured in
manpower per units of goods shipped—while less extreme, is still large. We use
goods rather than passengers because it is difficult to evaluate the role of transit
passengers, traveling from a region to another through many other regions.8 Given
the difficulties in measuring productivity in the public sector, care is needed in
interpreting these data. 
The indices of concentration of Italy’s police per macroeconomic area
reported on Table 3 are rather inconclusive. The higher density of officers charged
with law enforcement in the Southern regions—with generally poorer records in
terms of safety maintenance—reflects the government’s objective to prevent crim-
inal acts. The Southern ratio of police officers relative to the criminal age popula-
tion is 51 percent higher than in the North. This higher ratio should therefore have
a more significant deterrence effect on crime. The reported difference of law
enforcement officers relative to reported crime, however, is only 47 percent larger
in the South. This raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of a larger police
force on crime deterrence. Also, aggregate ratios conceal remarkable disparities
among single regions within the South that are nevertheless not easy to justify.
A different way of looking at productivity of public good provisions is to
consider users’ satisfaction. In the 1993 survey of the BIW, the heads of house-
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7We measure production of postal services in terms of the number of letters and parcels sent locally.
If we were to include the number of withdrawals from and payments into postal checking and savings
accounts, the productivity differentials would be even larger.
8The post office and the railways used to be administrations with the general government. The railway
company became a stock company in 1992 and the post office was turned into an independent public
agency in 1994. As a result the employees of both these entities are no longer employees of the general
government.holds were asked to report the use of local public services and to provide a quali-
tative evaluation of the services available.9 Table 4 compares the amount of public
services used across regions. The residents in the North indicate a higher use of
public transportation and health services. The Southerners, on the other hand, use
more education and childcare facilities, which is consistent with the different age
distribution in the two regions. Overall there appears to be no stronger reliance on
public services in the South than in the North.
Table 5 reports the results from individual evaluations of different types of
public services. In all the public functions (transportation, health services, educa-
tion, and municipal services), residents in the North are more satisfied with the
quality of local services. Obviously, these results should be taken cautiously given
their qualitative nature. However, they are consistent with the evidence of Putnam
(1993), who looks at several different measures of efficiency in different regions
of Italy. For example, Putnam assessed the responsiveness and effectiveness of
local bureaucracy in different regions of Italy by measuring processing time and
quality in response to three specific information requests. In the most efficient
regions (Emilia-Romagna and Valle d’Aosta, both in the North) two of three
requests received thorough replies within a week. In the least efficient regions
(Calabria, Campania, and Sardinia, all in the South), none of the requests received
any attention and only direct inquiry and personal visits led to a response. A
variety of other tests performed by this author reached similar conclusions. In fact,
this widely cited book is entirely devoted to documenting and explaining the
remarkable differences in public sector efficiency between the North and the
South of Italy.
In summary, this evidence suggests that public employment is skewed in favor
of the South without any benefit in terms of greater satisfaction for the public
services provided or more frequent use of public services.
II. Socioeconomic Consequences of the Distribution
of Public Employment
Wage Differentials
We begin by testing whether the public sector has a more equal payment structure
across regions than the private sector. Data on earnings are taken from the BIW
(Bank of Italy, 1995) and are based on reported monthly after-tax income. An
important caveat is that since earnings are measured after tax, and given the
progressivity of the tax system, this could understate the North-South wage differ-
ential. An additional potential problem with income data is underreported income
from nonmarket activities. Italy has a rather large gray economy that primarily
supplements income of households in the South. The omission of this income
source leads to overestimation of the North-South income gap and could bias the
Alberto Alesina,Stephan Danninger,and Massimo Rostagno
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9These questions were not asked in 1995.public-private income comparison. The latter problem may actually lead to an
understatement of the public sector wage premium if public employees are more
active in the gray market. This may be the case since reduced work hours and
relaxed enforcement in public offices allow much time for second jobs in the gray
economy. 
In Table 6, column 1, we report estimates from standard wage regressions for
public employees. In column 3 we run comparable regressions for the private
sector. The dependent variable is the log of hourly earnings of fully employed
workers and excludes self-employed workers (column 2). Hourly wages are
obtained by dividing monthly earnings by 4.35, the average number of workweeks
REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT: THE CASE OF ITALY
457
Table 4. Recent Use of Public Services
(1 = yes, 0 = no)
Use of Public Services
North Center South
Use of public transportation services 0.56 0.53 0.39*
Use of public health services  0.22 0.21 0.20
Medical tests in public laboratories  0.62 0.67 0.49*
Medical examinations (public)  0.52 0.48 0.41*
Use of medicines  0.81 0.84 0.79*
Nursery school attending  0.05 0.06 0.08*
Public primary, secondary school attending 0.20 0.27 0.31*
Public university attending  0.09 0.11 0.12*
Source: BIW (Bank of Italy, 1993).
Note: * indicates statistically significant differences of group means at 1 percent level.
Table 5. Quality of Public Services
(subjective evaluation: 1 = worst, 10 = best)
Quality Assessment
North Center South
Public transportation functioning  6.09 5.45 4.52*
Health services functioning 6.03 5.21 4.00*
University functioning 6.31 5.79 4.76*
Municipality offices functioning 6.27 5.57 4.60*
Municipality street cleaning  6.20 5.70 4.52*
Public parks and gardens availability  6.11 5.53 3.68*
Public water quality 5.01 4.54 3.91*
Safety and crime control  5.91 5.70 4.02*
Nursery school functioning  7.16 6.76 5.38*
Primary and secondary school functioning 6.97 6.68 5.65*
Source: BIW (Bank of Italy, 1993).
Note: * indicates statistically significant differences of group means at 1 percent level.458
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Table 6. Wage Regressions for the Private and Public Sector
(dependent variable: log hourly earnings from full-time employment)
Log Hourly Wages
Public sector Private sector
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 4.480 4.163 4.180
(105.2) (159.23) (156.18)
High school degree 0.063 0.095 0.091
(3.50) (6.73) (6.51)
College degree 0.246 0.252 0.242
(10.3) (8.23) (7.93)
Years work experience 0.037 0.042 0.041
(8.37) (13.11) (12.97)
Years work experience –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
(–5.96) (–9.41) (–9.24)
Female –0.105 –0.115 –0.106
(–7.66) (–9.56) (–8.52)
Married 0.064 0.100 0.101
(4.04) (7.60) (7.70)
Center 0.011 –0.070 –0.072
(0.66) (–4.99) (–5.21)
South    –0.014 –0.189 –0.192
(–0.99) (–13.79) (–14.00)




Mid-management 0.116 0.288 0.259
(4.00) (11.53) (10.14)
Top management 0.292 0.616 0.588
(7.21) (13.32) (12.69)
Firm size: 20–99 employees  0.114 0.110
(7.94) (7.54)
Firm size:100–499 employees 0.190 0.177
(11.36) (10.26)
Firm size: less than 500 employees 0.275 0.247
(17.64) (15.03)
Industry dummies  No No Yes
Adjusted R2 40.4 47.0 47.8
Source: BIW (Bank of Italy, 1995).
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. Excluded category for work qualification is blue collar
workers. Excluded category for industry dummies is manufacturing. The additional controls
included in the regressions are the following dummies: invalid worker, sick worker, and big city—
all statistically insignificant.a month. We then divide this number by reported weekly hours including over-
time.10
Focusing on the regional effects (the category left out is North), we find that
public sector wages are not statistically different between the South and the North.
On the contrary the results for the private sector are quite different. In column
three we estimate the same wage regression for private employees. We focus again
on the regional factors. Southern residents earn on average about 18.9 percent less
than their Northern counterparts. This result is robust even after we take worker
qualifications and industry structure into account. The other controls in the regres-
sion appear quite reasonable. Education implies a wage premium; years of work
experience increase wages but at a decreasing rate. Females receive a lower wage
even controlling for education and years of experience, and being married implies
a wage premium.11
We now proceed to a more direct evaluation of the public sector wage
premium in the North and South. Given the findings in Table 6, we expect that
public employees in the South earn a sizable wage premium over private sector
jobholders. Table 7 reports results from pooled (public and private) wage regres-
sions of fully employed workers. Again we focus first on regional wage effects.
Income from labor in the South is 13.6 percent lower than in the North. Also the
first column of this table shows that at a national level public employment pays
19.0 percent more than the average private sector job.12 We now examine whether
this premium differs by region. 
In columns 2 and 3, we decompose this effect by estimating the public sector
premium for the North and South. The public employment premium in the North
is still positive but considerably smaller at 12.5 percent. By contrast, in the South
of Italy we observe a public employment premium in excess of 26.0 percent over
local private sector employment. A direct comparison of these two figures
suggests that the Southern public sector wage premium is 13.5 percent (= 26 –
12.5) higher in the South. One explanation is that the regional public wage
premium may reflect a discrepancy in cost of living adjustments by the public and
the private sector. While the private sector at least partly compensates for the lower
cost of living, the public sector does not because of its nominal wage policy.
Alternatively, the regional wage discrepancy between the private and public sector
may be attributable to industry composition effects: the Southern private sector
may predominantly operate in relatively low wage industries or in industries that
do not negotiate wages at the national level. Part III of this paper contains a more
detailed empirical analysis of the regional public wage premium. The key finding
is that the public sector provides a substantial wage premium in the South, which
is likely to have distortionary effects on the Southern labor market. The total effect
is a combination of these two effects.
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10The comparison between private and public sector wages may be slightly affected by the fact that
overtime may be more widespread in the private sector. 
11A wage premium on being married is commonly found in the labor literature; see, for instance,
Polachek and Siebert (1993). The labor literature has discussed various alternative explanations of this
finding.
12This result is consistent with the findings of Gregory and Borland (1999).Family Persistence of Public Sector Jobs
We now examine whether there is a tendency for members of the same family to be
in the public sector: that is, we ask whether family ties to the public sector matter.
This is interesting for two reasons. First, if family ties matter, they may indicate that
a “culture” of public jobs is diffused in a family. A child raised in a culture of public
job security may aspire to the same type of career. Furthermore, if these cultural
effects are important, they may spill beyond the immediate family to a network of
connected individuals. Second, if family connection matters, it could mean that it
is easier to obtain a public job if a family member can help you get one through
personal contacts, inside information, recommendations, or favors.
We begin by exploring the influence of the employment history of other
family members on the likelihood of public sector employment. We compare the
frequency of public sector employment between two groups of individuals:
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Table 7. Pooled Wage Regression: Private and Public Sector
(dependent variable: log hourly earnings from full-time employment)
Log Hourly Wages
All Regions North South
(1) (2) (3)
Constant    4.168 4.238 3.85
(182.1) (147.22) (78.5)
High school degree 0.213 0.189 0.271
(21.2) (14.35) (12.9)
College degree 0.507 0.443 0.631
(30.9) (19.54) (20.62)
Years work experience 0.048 0.046 0.055
(18.0) (13.12) (9.63)
Years work experience –0.001 –0.001 0.001
(–11.9) (–8.24) (–6.67)
Female –0.099 –0.088 0.091
(–10.3) (–7.06) (–4.44)
Married 0.108 0.074 0.183
(9.9) (5.26) (7.99)
Mid-management 0.094 0.119 0.057
(5.3) (5.18) (1.46)






Public sector 0.190 0.125 0.260
(18.1) (8.69) (12.56)
Adjusted R2 44.3 41.6 50.9
Source: BIW (Bank of Italy, 1995).
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. Additional controls included in the regressions are the
following dummies: invalid worker, sick worker, and big city worker—all statistically insignificant.workers with ties to the public sector, and workers without ties. Table 8 considers
two types of family ties: between spouses and child-parent ties. In the latter cate-
gory we can distinguish between two types of children-parents ties: ties between
the head of the household and his or her parents, and the head of the household
and his or her children. The spousal tie is affected by a serious problem of reverse
causation and may therefore be biased; in fact, individuals may meet in the work-
place and then marry. 
Table 8 reveals how important family ties are for public employment. Children
of public sector employees are almost twice as likely to end up in the public sector,
relative to the others. The effect of spousal ties is strong, but perhaps not easily
interpretable. Note that the effects of family ties are prevalent in the North, South,
and Center. 
In addition to being less prone to participate in the labor force in general, chil-
dren of civil servants appear to have longer unemployment spells if unable to find
a public position in the first place (see Table 9). The conditional probability of
household members—aged 26 to 40—remaining unemployed if not hired by
government tends to rise (by 5.9 percent13) with the number of close family rela-
tives—parents and grandparents—who serve, or have served, as bureaucrats. In an
earlier version of this paper, we also investigated school choices of public
employees (and their children) relative to those employed in the private sector. We
found weak evidence that children of public employees make choices that appear
less “business oriented” than their counterparts in the private sector.
Job Search
Our hypothesis is that job searches in the South are mainly directed toward the
public sector, but we cannot observe the direction of worker’s job search efforts.
We can, however, observe the on-the-job search effort of different worker types,
namely, public and private sector employees. 
Table 10 (columns 1 and 3) reports Logit estimates of job search efforts
controlling for the employing sector and regional level of the unemployment rate.
The dependent is a dummy variable indicating whether a person has been looking
for a job in the recent past.14 As shown in column 1, holding a job in the public
sector (variable Public) significantly reduces the search effort. This suggests that
public sector jobs are secure and provide a very high level of satisfaction. Several
explanations for this finding are possible. The most obvious is that the high wage
premium for public jobs in the South discourages anyone from looking elsewhere.
Also, the workload may be even lower in the public sector than in comparable
private sector jobs. 
Finally, column 3 shows whether the Southern residents search less than
Northerners when they hold a public sector job. The interaction variable Public x
South is borderline (in)significant at the 10 percent level. This may suggest that
Southerners are searching less on the job than their Northern counterparts. This
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13This calculation is based on average marginal effect derived from Logit estimates.
14The sample is restricted to fully employed workers.evidence, although not very strong, is consistent with the result that public sector
jobs are particularly valued in the South.15
Entrepreneurship
Does a large dependence on public employment deter the development of
entrepreneurial activity? This issue is particularly important for Italy, since its
economy relies more than other OECD countries on small business activities.16
We identify four categories of entrepreneurial activity: (1) professionals; (2) busi-
ness owners; (3) independent workers or craftsmen; and (4) owners or assistants
in family businesses.
Table 11 reports the empirical results from Logit estimation where the depen-
dent variable is a binary indicator, equal to 1 if a respondent pursues an
entrepreneurial activity (as defined above) and zero otherwise.17 In regression 1,
we estimate entrepreneurship as a function of the level of schooling, work experi-
ence, and two regional variables: the regional unemployment rate and the fraction
of public employees in the labor force. We find that education increases the like-
lihood of entrepreneurship, while the regional variables have no significant
impact. The level of public employment has a negative sign but its effect is
insignificant. In column 2 we add information on the regional economic perfor-
mance (regional output over regional population). We find that residents of a
highly productive region are less likely to undertake an entrepreneurial activity.
Probably, low economic activity encourages self-employment, owing to a lack of
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Table 8. Family Ties1 in the Public Sector: Frequency of Public
Employment with Family Ties to the Public Sector
(in percent of all employees)
Child-Parent Ties Spousal Ties
Head of Household and Children of Spouse of
his/her Parents Head of Household Head of Household
Family ties Yes No Yes No Yes No
North 35.6 17.9 13.1 10.8 43.3 22.2
Center 42.8 25.1 21.9 12.9 52.4 23.2
South 48.8 23.9 33.9 14.9 63.4 29.5
Source: BIW (Bank of Italy, 1995). 
1Family ties to the public sector are defined as having one or more immediate family member
(parent or spouse) who holds or held a job in the public sector.  Sample weights applied. All group
mean differences are statistically significant.
15We have also explored whether the type of education of the workers—business or more business—
affected their search effort. We did not find significant effects.
16An OECD study (1995) reports that Italy has a large number of small- and medium-sized firms in
its core industries. About 36.8 percent of all employees in Italy work in firms with less than 200
employees compared with 20.8 percent in Germany, 25.8 percent in France, and 34.1 percent in Japan.
17The sample is limited to heads of households older than age 20.alternative employment opportunities. More interesting in this model is the public
employment effect. The estimated coefficient on public employment is negative
and significant at the 5 percent level. Thus, even though a lower productivity level
on average would tend to encourage entrepreneurship, the presence of a large
public sector tends to offset this effect. This result is robust to controlling for the
family background of the respondent, as shown in the last column of Table 11.
III. The Size of Regional Redistribution Through Public Employment
We now evaluate the size of the regional redistribution obtained through public
employment. We distinguish between two components: the quantity effect (Q),
namely, the “excess” number of public jobs; and the price effect (P), that is, the
“wage premium” paid to public employees in the South, to be defined below. Our
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Table 9. Unemployment of Young Italians (Age 25–40)
and Family Ties1 (Logit)
(dependent variable: unemployed,2 1 = yes, 0 = no)
Unemployment Incidence2








Years work experience    –0.418
(–4.4)
Years of work experience 0.014
(3.9)
Center    0.805
(4.2)






Married          –0.519
(–1.2)
Log Lik  –683.6
Source: BIW (Bank of Italy, 1995) 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
1Family ties to the public sector are defined as having one (or more) immediate family member
(parent or spouse) who holds or held a job in the public sector.  Children with a public job have
been excluded from the sample.
2Incidence of unemployment conditional on not having been hired by the public sector.estimate of the implicit interregional transfer (TR) through public employment is
given by:
(1)
where, Q ≡ (EC – EB)/EC and P ≡ ( WC – WB)/WC.
In equation (1) TR is the implicit monetary value of the interregional transfer,
EC is the current number of public employees in the South, EB a numerical bench-
mark to be specified below, WC the average wage rate currently paid to public
employees in the South, and WB a benchmark wage to be defined below.18 We call
the expression Q = (EC – EB)/EC the quantity effect and P = (WC – WB)/WC the
TR E E W E W W QW E PW E CB CB CB C C C B =− ( ) +− ( ) =+ ,
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Table 10. Job Search Activity in Private and Public Sector (Logit)
(dependent variable: job search: 1 = yes, 0 = no)
Job Search
(1) (2) (3)
Constant –0.955 –1.250 –1.286
(–4.27) (–5.00) (–5.12)
Years of schooling  0.005 0.005 0.006
(0.34) (0.31) (0.37)
Years work experience  –0.062 –0.063 –0.062
(–10.68) (–10.77) (–10.72)
Female –0.093 –0.079 –0.077
(–0.87) (–0.74) (–0.72)
Public –1.406 –1.421 –1.244
(–8.72) (–8.80) (–6.67)
Public x South –0.531
(–1.65)
Center –0.002 –0.108 –0.115
(–0.01) (–0.77) (–0.82)
South 0.193 –0.393 –0.312
(1.60) (–1.52)
(–1.18)
Regional unemployment rate  4.442 4.451
(2.62) (2.63)
Log Lik –1408.1 –1404.5 –1403.1
Source: BIW (Bank of Italy, 1995).
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. Model 4 restricted to workers with at least a high school
degree.
18When calculating TR, we multiply the excess wage payment (WC – WB) by the base employment
level EB and not by EC. We leave out the amount (EC – EB)(WC – WB) from this computation, since this
part of the transfer payment is already accounted for in the first term (EC – EB)WC.price effect. After rearranging of terms and substituting for EB we obtain the
following expression for TR:
(2)
The main task in determining the quantity effect is to construct a baseline rule
for the level of public employment, which is to identify EB. Since it is not obvious
how to do this, we offer several different estimates for EB. Also, to highlight the
North-South comparison, we use only the characteristics of the North as the deter-
minants for the baseline scenario for the South. 
In order to estimate the price effect, P, we need to compute WB, the “bench-
mark” salary for public employees in the South. This can be tackled from two
angles. First, one can define the benchmark in terms of the wage rate payable if
the public wage policy were to conform to the norm of equalizing regional public
compensations in real terms. Second, one can construct an institutional counter-
TR W E Q Q P CC =+ − ( ) ( ) 1 .
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Table 11. Model of Entrepreneurial Activity (Logit)
(dependent variable: entrepreneur: 1 = yes, 0 = no)
Entrepreneur
(1) (2) (3)
Constant –0.747 1.644 1.364
(–1.96) (2.04) (1.64)
Years schooling 0.035 0.037 0.023
(2.92) (3.09) (1.89)
Years work experience –0.057 –0.056 –0.051
(–2.72) (–2.64) (–2.34)
Years work experience 0.001 0.001 0.001
(4.10) (4.01) (3.38)
Regional unemployment rate 0.959 –3.598 –3.313
(1.23) (–2.32) (–2.07)
Regional output/GDP –63.656 –60.625
(–3.37) (–3.11)






Log Lik –1816.3 –1810.6 –1727.9
Source: BIW (Bank of Italy, 1995).
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.  
1Father either professional, self-employed, owner of business, or entrepreneur.factual and ask which wage rate would be paid in the South if Italy were not a
unified country. A natural candidate for WB would be, in this case, a measure of
the nominal wage prevailing in the private sector to remunerate labor of compa-
rable quality. We pursue both strategies below.
The Quantity Effect
One-dimensional baseline estimates
The simplest approach for the calculation of Q is to assume that the South should
have the same level of public employment per unit of a particular characteristic,
that is, regional attribute, as the North. We present four alternative attributes: the
size of the labor force, employment, regional output, and the regional level of
consumption. The baseline estimates for the North are then calculated as the ratio
of northern public employment over the specific regional characteristics. It is not
obvious what is the “best” measure, and therefore we present a menu of them. For
example, from the point of view of economic efficiency alone, public employment
should be roughly a constant fraction of the population across regions; in this case,
the population weight is the correct one. If, instead, economic efficiency is seen to
suggest that the public sector should be a certain fraction of GDP, then output
weights or employment weights are preferable.
In Table 12 (first row) we report several different baseline estimates derived from
northern regional observations. The baseline estimate in column 3, for example, is
obtained by dividing the Northern public employment by total Northern employment,
and it implies a baseline fraction of 12.1 percent of the employed population. 
All Southern regions have excess public employment according to all four
baseline rules. In the second row of Table 12 we report estimates of excess public
employment for the South as a whole. Predicted excessive employment is
measured as a fraction of the respective Southern regional public employment.
The smaller estimates of excess employment are based on the population.
Estimates are higher when we take the full economic disparities into account. The
employment- and output-based rules imply that 43 percent to 55 percent of the
public employment in the South is above the baseline limits. Two regions in
South—Molise and Basilicata—have the highest “excessive” public employment. 
Multidimensional estimates: Wagner regressions
The estimates just discussed do not take into account that different characteristics of
the economies in the Northern and Southern regions may “require” different levels of
public employment, purely for economic reasons. Any attempt to determine the
“optimal size” of public employment on a regional base should be undertaken with
caution. Here we estimate a regional model of public employment in the spirit of
Wagner’s Law.19 We construct a provincial data set derived from residential informa-
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19There is a rich empirical literature testing the time-series implications of this proposition.
Relatively little research has been conducted using cross sectional information. One exception is Eberts
and Gronberg (1992).tion in the Bank of Italy survey (1993 and 1995). Each individual in the survey can
be identified by his or her province of residence and reported sector of employment
(that is, private versus public). This information allows us to develop provincial
attributes by calculating provincial population averages. In total we obtain informa-
tion on 99 provinces that can be mapped to the 20 main regions in Italy.20 To maxi-
mize the degrees of freedom, we expand our data set and merge data from the 1993
survey with the 1995 survey. We end up with an average of 484 observations for each
province: the lowest number of observations is 36, and the maximum is 3,135. All
provincial characteristics are then derived by calculating weighted means of indi-
vidual observations using population weights from the survey.21 Income variables are
expressed in 1993 Lire. Given the data problems and the way we have to construct
these provincial data, the results of these Wagner regressions should be taken as
suggestive and indicative.
In Table 13, we report the regression results for the Northern provinces, where
the dependent variable is the fraction of public employment over total employ-
ment. The model with the best fit is the more narrowly defined Northern model.
All the control variables point in the expected direction even though standard
errors are high. For instance, higher levels of income lead—albeit with weak
evidence—to more public employment. As additional determinants of public
employment, we used information on the employment structure of a province, the
fraction of old (older than 65) and young residents (younger than 15), and the
degree of urbanization. We also use as a control the fraction of employment in the
service industries. In an earlier version of this paper, we explored alternative spec-
ifications, including restricting the definition of what is included in the Northern
regions. The results do not change much; in fact, they often improve.
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Table 12. One-Dimensional Baseline Rules and Excess 
Public Employment in the South
Baseline Rules
Regional Regional
Population Labor force Employment product1 consumption1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline rule 0.05 0. 113 0.121 1.636 2.331
Predicted excess public 
employment in 
South (percent) 19.6 32.2 43.5 54.9 37.6
Sources: Italian Treasury (1996); and ISTAT (1996a).
1Measured in billions of Lire.
20Among these provinces, 43 are part of the North and 35 are part of the South. The number of
provinces in each region varies from 1 to 10.
21Since the 1993 and the 1995 surveys contain the same questions, we do not need to modify the vari-
ables of interest.We now turn to the estimation of public employment in the South relative to
the benchmark. We obtain predicted levels of public employment by using the esti-
mates from Table 13. Before we can derive these estimates, however, we need to
tackle two issues. First, the level of income in the South has not been adjusted for
differences in the cost of living. If we evaluate the Wagner model for the North at
the nominal level of income in the South we would overestimate the real income
differences and thus overestimate the level of excessive public employment. This
is because the price level in the South is lower, and therefore the nominal income
of the South underestimates the real income of the South relative to the North. We
correct for this difference by increasing the level of income by 15 percent and,
more extremely, by 25 percent.22 Note that these corrections will lead to lower
estimates of excessive public employment. A second issue is the size difference of
the Southern provinces. To obtain a combined estimate for total Southern exces-
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Log of total income2 0.1865
(1.62)










Number of observations 43
Source: BIW (Bank of Italy, 1993 and 1995) plus regional data from ISTAT.   
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. For definition of regions see text.  
1Public employment as a fraction of all provincial employment 1995 income has been deflated
to 1993 using the CPI deflator. 
2Disposable total income.
3Defined as bank insurance, real estate and personal services, and communication and
transportation.
4Fraction of population younger than 15 and older than 65.  
5Defined as 70 years and older.  
6Defined as the fraction of provincial residents living in a city with more than 25,000 inhabitants.
22In the next section we provide estimates of the difference in cost of living, which are consistent with
the range of these adjustments.sive public employment, we need to weight the provincial predictions before we
can add them up. We do this by applying provincial weights derived from popula-
tion weights from the BIW 1993 and 1995.
Table 14 summarizes the results of this exercise. The multivariate model
predicts an excessive employment rate between 38 percent and 43 percent. The
regions with the highest levels of excessive public employment according to this
measure are Campania, Puglia, and Calabria, and they differ from the one-dimen-
sional estimates. Finally, regional per capita income and the rate of excessive
public employment are negatively correlated with a coefficient of (–0.21). This
observation hints at the use of public employment as a redistributive device.
To sum up, one-dimensional estimates of excessive public employment lie
between 20 percent–55 percent of total public employment in the South. The
multivariate estimates have a smaller range and lie between 38 percent and 43
percent. 
The Price Effect
Price Effect 1: cost of living adjustment
First we estimate by how much the public sector would have to reduce wages in
the South in order to equalize pay in real terms, between the North and the South.
This is a simple measure of the implicit subsidy that is due to the higher real wage
for public employees in the South.
Our estimates for regional price differences are derived from cost of living
data for Italian cities. As mentioned above, ISTAT, the Italian statistical agency,
does not provide price level indices for different regions. We therefore use data of
city price deflators for the period 1947–95 to calculate the cumulative price diver-
gence between the North and the South. We assume that the cost of living differ-
ence between the North and the South was small at the beginning of the period.
We use data from six northern and seven southern cities.23 The accumulated differ-
ence of the average price index amounts to 14.3 percent by 1995. We also derived
alternative measures of real income differences from wage regressions of the
private sector. Our estimates are very similar and range between 15–18 percent.
These regression results are available from the authors upon request. This measure
of price level difference probably underestimates the extent of the higher cost of
living in the North. Cannari, Nucci, and Sestito (2000), looking at real estate
prices, suggest much larger differences between the North and South.
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23Cost of living data are available for the following cities: North: Turin (Piedmont), Genoa (Liguria),
Trento (Trentino), Triest (Friuli), Bologna (Emilia-Romagna), and Venezia (Veneto); South: Campo Basso
(Molise), Napoli (Campania), Bari (Puglia), Potenza (Basilicata), Reggio Calabria (Calabria), Palermo,
and Catania (Sicily).Price Effect 2: adjustment to public-private pay structure
An alternative way to calculate the price effect is to ask which wage rate would be
paid in the South region if Italy were not a unified country. A natural determinant
for the Southern baseline wage, WB, would be the wage rate that generates the
same public-private sector pay structure as in the North. This comparison would
not only account for differences in the cost of living but also take into account
regional differences in productivity. 
We run two types of wage regressions, one for the North in order to determine
the base public-private sector wage structure, and one for the South (see Table 15
for the results). We assume that public sector work is similar to the service sector,
and therefore that the public-private sector wage comparison should focus on the
service sector. We use the following service sector industries: banking and insur-
ance, real estate, and personal services. However, since wages in the banking and
insurance sector are to a large extent set on the national level, the Southern public-
private sector comparison is somewhat biased. For this reason we run a separate
set of regressions specifically controlling for the banking and insurance sector
from the private service sector. 
To determine the Northern pay structure, we run a pooled (public and private)
wage regression for fully employed Northern residents only. We use the same
control variables as above but also include a dummy for employment in the private
service sector. We exclude public sector employment. We find that in the North the
private service sector pays on average 7.2 percent (column 1) less than the public
sector. When we leave out the banking sector the differential is substantially larger
at 18.0 percent. We can now compare this finding with estimates from the South
(Table 12, columns 3 and 4). The wage differential between public and private
service sector employees is much larger. On average, public employees earn about
24.9 percent more than their private sector counterparts if we include the banking
sector, and a stunning 40.5 percent more if we exclude the banking sector. 
By what amount would the Southern wage have to be adjusted to achieve the
Northern pay structure? If the Northern public-private pay structure were to
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Table 14. Predicted Percentage of Excessive Public Employment in
Southern Provinces Based on Northern Wagner Regression
Northern Provinces
(1)
Southern income adjusted1 by 15 percent 42.9
Southern income adjusted1 by 25 percent 38.5
Source: BIW (Bank of Italy, 1993 and 1995) plus regional data from ISTAT.   
Note: Excess public employment is calculated as the difference between the average actual
Southern public employment and predicted employment rate divided by the actual rate.  Predictions
are weighted and based on Southern evaluations of Northern Wagner regression. As weights we use
provincial sums of analytical weights from BIW.  
1Southern income has been increased by 15 percent (25 percent) to adjust for regional differ-
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Table 15. Wage Regressions for the North 
and South: Public-Private Pay Structure
(dependent variable: log hourly earnings from full-time employment)
Log hourly wages
North South
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 4.373 4.382 4.109 4.133
(128.4) (126.6) (75.3) (75.4)
High school degree 0.184   0.174     0.269     0.245
(13.9)  (12.9)    (12.8)    (11.5)
College degree 0.438   0.427     0.629     0.602
(19.3)  (18.3)    (20.5)    (19.2)
Years work experience 0.045   0.045     0.054     0.052
(13.1)   (12.9)     (9.6)     (9.2)
Years work experience –0.001  –0.001   –0.001   –0.00
(–8.3)   (–8.1)     (–6.6)     (–6.3)
Female –0.094   –0.081     –0.092     –0.074
(–7.5)  (–6.3)    (–4.4)    (–3.6)
Married 0.075   0.072     0.183     0.185
(5.3)   (5.0)     (7.9)     (8.0)
Mid-management 0.111   0.099     0.055     0.025
(4.8)    (4.0)      (1.4)      (0.6)
Top management 0.283   0.265     0.136     0.135
(7.4)   (6.6)     (2.1)     (2.0)
Nonservice sector –0.139   –0.141     –0.263     –0.270
(–9.3)   (–9.4)     (–11.7)     (–12.1)
Service sector –0.072   –0.249
(–3.4)   (–7.9)
Service sector without banks and insurance –0.180     –0.405
(–7.2)     (–10.8)
R2 41.9 41.3 50.9 52.4
Source: BIW (Bank of Italy, 1995).
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses. Excluded industry category is public employment.  The
service sector consists of banking and insurance, real estate, and personal services. The nonservice
sector consists of agriculture, manufacturing, telecommunications, construction, and transportation.
Additional controls included in the regressions: invalid worker, sick worker, and big city worker—
all statistically insignificant.prevail in the South, our estimates indicate that public wages would have to adjust
downward by 17.7 percent. These estimates are slightly lower than the cost of
living estimates. If we drop the banking sector from our comparison, the wage gap
increases to 15.6 percent. Again we find that the estimated wage adjustments are
similar to our previous results.
The Total Cost of Excessive Public Employment
We are now able to provide an estimate of the cost of excessive public employ-
ment. We recall from earlier that interregional transfer cost is defined as:
(3)
where WCEC is the current expenditure on public employment in the South and Q
and P are the quantity and price effects, respectively. The earlier results indicate
that the excessive rate of public employment in the South, Q, lies between 20 to
55 percent with a more narrow range of 38–44 percent from the Wagner estimates.
On the other hand, the price effect, P, which measures the excessive payment
levels, ranged roughly from 11 to 18 percent. We can use these two pieces of infor-
mation and calculate the combined effect as described in equation (3) above. The
total effect ranges between a minimum at 30 percent and a maximum at 65 percent
of the public sector wage bill for the South. Taking the middle range of the Wagner
estimates and the middle range for the price effect, we get a value of almost
exactly 0.5.
IV. Conclusion
The allocation of public employment in Italy is an important source of geograph-
ical redistribution between regions, in particular between the North and the South.
About half of the wage bill of the South can be thought of as redistributive, that is,
in excess of what it “should be” relative to various ways of calculating a bench-
mark. This amount is the result of a quantity and a price effect. The former is due
to the fact that there are many more public employees in the South relative to the
North; the second arises because, while public wages are very similar across
regions, the price level instead is lower in the South, so that real wages are higher
in the South.
The heavy reliance on attractive public jobs in the South leads to a vicious
circle in which private sector jobs are not sought after. This also implies that for
private entrepreneurs it is expensive to offer jobs as attractive as those offered by
the public sector. The result is that the economy in the South is overly dependent
on public jobs that are of the nature of permanent welfare. The problem is
compounded by the use (and misuse) of disability pensions, which are also
concentrated in the South and are in many cases another source of permanent
unemployment compensation.
TR W E Q Q P CC =+ − ( ) ( ) 1 ,
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